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This Essay will first review and then analyze the characteristics of each of three possible
routes of convergence in light of three features. The first is stability and predictability of the legal
environment. It is the main benefit that private investors look for before investing in a country. The
second is the scope of influence and lobbying of interest groups. This feature is extracted from an
analysis of the adoption of uniform laws proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (”NCCUSL”) by Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi. These authors find
evidence of enactment by states of NCCUSL’s proposals despite a cost-benefit analysis suggest-
ing that these proposals are not efficient. This inefficiency results from the influence of interest
groups and NCCUSL’s reliance on ill-informed generalists. The third feature is the respect for,
or promotion of, public interest considerations. This analysis may reveal a tension between the
economic efficiency and the social desirability of these routes, between market-driven policy and
public interest concerns. This tension plays out in different ways. The more commonly addressed
conflicts of interests are between public players and private investors; between (1) the interests of
the host country in obtaining adequate financial and technical safeguards and assurances from the
private participants that the project will be carried out safely, on time, and in the public interest
and (2) the interests of private participants in limiting the type and number of guarantees that they
give. The less explored tension addresses the respect for standards, such as human rights stan-
dards, that the host country itself may be reluctant to promote, but that affect private investment
in terms of reputation or expense. This Essay disregards the tension between economic efficiency
and social desirability, and rather focuses on the goal of reconciling private and public interest
concerns. It will seek to determine whether one of these routes is better than the others, or whether
a combination of the three is the best way to achieve convergence in international project finance.
In conclusion, this Essay will show that all three routes to convergence are necessary to both foster
and control international project finance. The twin goals of balancing private and public interests
are best fulfilled at the international level, since this level can generate clear, balanced, and uniform
rules by promulgating a suitable model law yet to be prepared. State initiative is then required to
enact these rules and adapt them to domestic specificities. The establishment of a legal framework
at the state level should be general and flexible enough not to suffocate private initiative since the
latter brings innovation and evolution of norms in project finance. No one route can therefore be
preferred over any other. If one is used alone, it is more likely to be inefficient.




Today many countries are either unable or unwilling to
fund traditionally "public sector" projects.1 These countries are
increasingly withdrawing from the financing, construction, and
operation of those essential projects. Instead they appeal to
both domestic and international private investment.2 Project fi-
nance has developed in response to this critical need.3 For
many, if not all, states, harnessing private sector skills and exper-
* Adjunct Professor, The University of Texas School of Law. This Essay is part of a
more extensive work to come. Julius G. Getman, Douglas Laycock, Richard S. Marko-
vits, Alan Rau, Jim Rossi, and Jay L. Westbrook read earlier drafts of this Essay and
provided useful advice and criticism. Jonathan Pratter provided helpful research assis-
tance. Any error or misjudgment remains solely mine.
This Essay assumes that the reader is knowledgeable in project finance. For gen-
eral reading on project finance, see GRAHAM D. VINTER, PROJECT FINANCE, A LEGAL
GUIDE (2d ed. 1998); ScoTr L. HOFFMAN, THE LAw AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL
PROJECT FINANCE, A RESOURCE FOR GOVERNMENTS, SPONSORS, LENDERS, LAWYERS AND
PROJECT PARTICIPANTS (1998).
1. These projects cover sectors such as power, transport, telecommunications, and
water and more recently education and prison that were traditionally funded and run
by governments are nowadays financed, developed, and operated by private investors.
This Essay will only focus on these projects that are usually large infrastructure projects.
2. Private capital has become a major source of financing for traditionally publicly
funded infrastructure projects. Private companies invested $96 billion in project fi-
nance transactions in 1998, down from $119 billion in 1997 largely due to the Asian
crisis, but up from $29 billion in 1994. See Benjamin C. Esty, Petrozuata: A Case Study of
the Effective Use of Project Finance, 12 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 26, 26 (1999).
3. Project financing is not a new funding technique, but its use re-emerged in the
early 1980s to finance the construction and operation of traditionally public funded or
regulated projects. The project financing technique was used in commerce in the Mid-
dle Ages until the 17th century. For example, in 1299, the English Crown negotiated a
loan from a leading Italian merchant bank of that period, the Frescobaldi, to develop
the Devon silver mines. The loan contract provided that the lender would be entitled
to control the operation of the mines for one year to service its debt. During that year,
the lender could take as much refined ore as it could extract, but it had to pay all costs
of operating the mines. There was no provision for interest. The English Crown did
not provide any guarantee (nor did anyone else) concerning the quantity or quality of
silver that could be extracted during that period. See Global Development Project Finance &
Project Management Information Site (Feb. 28, 1999), available at http://members.aol.
com/AllenWeb/infosite.hun.
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rise together with capital is key to economic and social develop-
ment.
In this context, project finance is a debt finance technique
used for the development of a public infrastructure project (e.g.,
construction and operation of a power plant, a port, or a road)
where lenders look primarily to the cash flow produced by the
project to service their debt rather than to other sources of se-
curity such as government guarantees or project sponsors' assets
or credit. A special-purpose vehicle, the project company, is
commonly created to carry out the construction, operation, and
maintenance of the project under a concession (or license)
given by the public authority of the host country. This company
also raises the financing necessary for the development of the
project.4 Project finance can then take on different forms de-
pending on the rights and obligations of the project company
under the concession agreement.'
Projects financed using this technique tend to be large in
scale, requiring large funding packages. Private investors (pri-
vate sector sponsors as well as lenders) are thus solicited to bring
into the host country the large amount of money that these
projects require. Their motivation for investing in a project is
not only to make profits, but often also to satisfy a strategic com-
mercial objective.'
4. Because the lenders cannot rely on established credit or balance sheet of the
project company, the financing modality for the development of a project is called
"project finance." In a project finance transaction, the shareholders of the project com-
pany, the sponsors, usually want to limit their equity investment to 20-30% of the total
project costs, the remaining 70 to 80% being paid by loan proceeds. Project financing
is either non-recourse (where lenders can only have recourse to the cash flow of the
project) or limited recourse (where lenders are entitled in addition to look to certain
assets of the borrower and project sponsors).
5. Under the commonly used form "build-operate-transfer" ("BOT"), the project
company is awarded a concession to finance, build, and operate a facility that would
normally be financed, built, and operated by the public authority. At the expiry or
termination of the concession agreement, the project company transfers the facility,
together with the project assets, technology and services, to the public authority. How-
ever, the project company may not have any obligation to transfer under the variant-
"build-own-operate" ("BOO"); or it may, in addition, own the project facility during the
life of the concession-"build-own-operate-transfer" ("BOOT"). Other forms reflect
specific services to be performed (e.g., management and modernization) and may use a
different terminology. For instance, the United Kingdom uses mainly two forms for its
projects-"design, build, finance, and operate" ("DBFO") and "design, construct, man-
age, and finance" ("DCMF").
6. See GRAHAM VINTER, PROJECT FINANCE, A LEGAL GUIDE 2-5 (2d ed. 1998).
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Project finance should be a vehicle of economic and social
development for the host country that is respectful of the host's
interests and preferences and a source of gain for the other in-
terested parties. The difficult goal of project finance is to recon-
cile private interests and public policy considerations, to strike a
balance between facilitating and encouraging private participa-
tion and meeting the host country's public interest. Rather than
working in unfamiliar and differing legal regimes, market par-
ticipants prefer to deal with one set of legal rules and principles.
They look for a safe, stable, and predictable legal environment,
ensuring, for instance, impartial application of regulations,
transparency of laws and respect for private property, and for a
flexible legal regime allowing innovation and creativity. Host
states, in turn, want to obtain adequate safeguards and assur-
ances that the project will be run in the public interest, ensuring,
for instance, continuity in the provision of public services; skill
transfer and local employment; compliance with health, safety,
and quality standards; and environmental protection.7
Convergence of law8 can help achieve these twin private-
public goals. It is a response to the aversion of private investors
to any legal, commercial, or local divergences or uncertainties in
a host country. Investors view any of these divergences or uncer-
tainties as increasing risk. Convergence is a way to mitigate risk
and create a safer investment environment. It gives investors
certainty as to the legal rules that will apply and accordingly
reduces the costs created by inefficient, silent, and parochial
state laws. The benefits of convergence are even greater in fields
involving players from more than one country and where inter-
national disparities can otherwise create further uncertainty and
cost.9 From the public sector's perspective, convergence of law
7. See id. at 1; see also UNCITRAL, Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects: Draft
Chapters of a Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects, Report of
the Secretary-General, Introduction and Background Information on Privately Fi-
nanced Infrastructure Project, 33d Sess., at 4, A/CN.9/471/Add.1 (2000) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Introduction and Background Information].
8. Law is here used in the wider sense to embrace both positive law and private
practice.
9. For the benefits of convergence in international subject-matters, see Jay Law-
rence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2276, 2277
(2000); John Honnold, A Uniform Law for International Sales, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 299
(1959); Hessel E. Yntema, Unification of the Laws Respecting Negotiable Instruments, 4 INrT'L
L.Q. 178, 178 (1951).
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helps establish a legal framework by which the host country en-
sures provision of, and regulates, public services for its citizens
and by which public service providers and their customers can
protect their rights while attracting private investment.
Convergence of positive law and private practice is already
happening in reality. It is the outcome of public lawmaking by
state legislators and private ordering through standardization of
practice. To deny this trend would be inappropriate and would
ignore the acute infrastructure capital needs and capital invest-
ment realities that exist globally. Given this ineluctable trend,
energies should rather be turned to providing the best legal
framework for project finance. The search for the best frame-
work requires an understanding of the various routes leading to
it.
There are three different levels of promulgation of norms.
The first results from spontaneous government initiatives to en-
act project finance legislation or define standard form contracts;
this is the state route. The second is created by the work and
practice of industry groups, financiers, and private practitioners
leading to the development of standard form contracts and prac-
tices; this is the private route. The third derives from the efforts
of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") to define
common legal rules and principles or to provide legal recom-
mendations in project finance that member states may choose to
enact; this is the international route.
This Essay will first review and then analyze the characteris-
tics of each of these routes in the light of three features. The
first is stability and predictability of the legal environment. It is
the main benefit that private investors look for before investing
in a country. The second is the scope of influence and lobbying
of interest groups. This feature is extracted from an analysis of
the adoption of uniform laws proposed by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")1°
by Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi. l" These authors find evi-
10. The NCCUSL operates by drafting uniform law proposals, which are then con-
sidered for enactment by state legislatures. Its proposals are drafted by commissioners
(appointed by state governors) and then approved at annual meetings by states (at least
20, each state exercising one vote).
11. Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi analyze and provide evidence (1) that NC-
CUSL's proposals can lead to efficient uniformity and (2) that the proposals can also
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dence of enactment by states of NCCUSL's proposals despite a
cost-benefit analysis suggesting that these proposals are not effi-
cient.12 This inefficiency results from the influence of interest
groups and NCCUSL's reliance on ill-informed generalists. 3
The third feature is the respect for, or promotion of, public in-
terest considerations.
This analysis may reveal a tension between the economic ef-
ficiency and the social desirability of these routes, between mar-
ket-driven policy and public interest concerns. This tension
plays out in different ways. The more commonly addressed con-
flicts of interests are between public players and private inves-
tors; between (1) the interests of the host country in obtaining
adequate financial and technical safeguards and assurances from
the private participants that the project will be carried out safely,
on time, and in the public interest and (2) the interests of pri-
vate participants in limiting the type and number of guarantees
that they give. The less explored tension addresses the respect
for standards, such as human rights standards, that the host
country itself may be reluctant to promote, but that affect private
investment in terms of reputation or expense.
This Essay disregards the tension between economic effi-
ciency and social desirability, and rather focuses on the goal of
reconciling private and public interest concerns. It will seek to
determine whether one of these routes is better than the others,
or whether a combination of the three is the best way to achieve
convergence in international project finance.
In conclusion, this Essay will show that all three routes to
convergence are necessary to both foster and control interna-
tional project finance. The twin goals of balancing private and
public interests are best fulfilled at the international level, since
this level can generate clear, balanced, and uniform rules by
promulgating a suitable model law yet to be prepared. State ini-
tiative is then required to enact these rules and adapt them to
domestic specificities. The establishment of a legal framework at
result in enactment of inefficient laws. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An
Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 132 (1996).
12. Id. at 142.
13. "Under the economic theory of interest groups, legislators may pass inefficient
laws that benefit small but concentrated interest groups that can organize relatively
cheaply at the expense of larger but more dispersed groups that have higher organiza-
tions costs." Id.
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the state level should be general and flexible enough not to suf-
focate private initiative since the latter brings innovation and
evolution of norms in project finance. No one route can there-
fore be preferred over any other. If one is used alone, it is more
likely to be inefficient.
I. CONVERGENCE OF LAW AT THE STATE LEVEL: A
SPONTANEOUS PROCESS OF STATE INITIATIVE
Some countries, such as Finland, do not provide any special
legal framework for project finance. The applicable rules are
thus to be found in general contract, property, and business or-
ganization law. However, under market pressure, or for legal
and/or political reasons, many countries have been led to, or
encouraged to, adopt general or specific legislation on project
finance or to amend their current legislation to attract private
investment. This process of state initiative has resulted in spon-
taneous convergence. To varying extents, the process reveals the
promulgating state's knowledge, and awareness, of international
practices in project finance. It also shows the state's creativity in
adapting those provisions required by market participants to
their national and local context.
However, countries may be subject to interest group pres-
sure that may persuade them to enact inappropriate legal provi-
sions or market-driven laws that do not fit their legal traditions
and social concerns. The Essay will first review and then analyze
the characteristics of convergence of law at the state level by
looking at three examples.
A. Characteristics of Convergence of Law at the State Level:
Three Examples
There are different state legal approaches to project fi-
nance. Some countries, such as Italy, Turkey, and China, have
enacted general project finance laws, whereas others, such as
Russia, have adopted special-sector laws to respond to the needs
and expectations of private investors. Still other states, for in-
stance the United Kingdom, have standardized their contract
forms used in project finance transactions. Despite the varying
approaches, states have nonetheless adopted similar provisions.
127720011
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1. Standardization of Contracts by a State: The United
Kingdom Example
In the early 1990s, the British government launched at the
national level an initiative called the Private Finance Initiative
("PFI") .14 As stated by the current Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Gordon Brown,
[T] he key to future economic success is investment and part-
nership. Investment is needed in infrastructure, technology
and people. In the drive to equip Britain for the 21st century,
some projects may best be managed by the Government itself.
However, in many cases, the involvement of private sector
skills offers the prospect of better value for money. Increas-
ingly, a combination of both public and private skills will be
necessary and desirable. 15
This is the philosophy of the PFI. 6 The Treasury Taskforce has
drawn up a list of some significant cost-saving projects resulting
from the partnership with the private sector when compared
with traditional procurement routes. 7 In addition to PFI, cer-
tain sector-specific issues have been addressed by legislation. 8
One of the major priorities of the Labour government was
14. The policy of the PFI was launched in the autumn of 1992 by Norman Lamont
when he was a Chancellor of the Exchequer and pursued by Kenneth Clarke as Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer in November 1993. At this time, the UK Treasury published a
booklet called Breaking New Ground with the following subtitle Towards a New Partnership
Between the Public and Private Sectors.
15. Id.
16. For more information on the PFI, see http://www.treasury-projects-taskforce.
gov.uk.
17. The average cost saving for the first eight DBFO road contracts was 15%, the
Bridgend and Fazakerley prison projects represent a saving of more that 10% over the
contract lives, the replacement for the national insurance recording system is estimated
to cost up to 60% less than an equivalent public sector development, and the Home
Office's Immigration Casework IT project is expected to generate productivity improve-
ments of at least 40%.
In addition to this reduction of costs, the National Audit Office disclosed in June
that Carillion and Group 4, who financed, built, and now run Fazakerley prison, raised
their expected rate of return on the deal by 75% once the project was up and running.
Refinancing gave them a 14 million pounds gain. For a discussion on the extent to
which the Government departments and agencies have not negotiated the right to
share in any windfall profits made on most PFI deals they have signed, in spite of trea-
sury guidance last year to do so, see Nicholas Trimmins, Treasury Missing Out on Share in
Windfall Profits From Pff Deals, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2000, at 1.
18. For instance, in the healthcare sector, arguments over two sector-specific issues
that proved unbankable caused a major delay. These issues were ultimately addressed
by new legislation, the National Health System Trust Covenant.
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to produce model form terms and conditions and then, with a
little more experience, to promote a standard approach to the
PFI process. In consultation with other departments, the Trea-
sury Taskforce published guidance documents to assist both pro-
curers and providers. Those documents included Basic Contrac-
tual Terms issued in October 1996 and Further Contractual Issues in
February 1997. According to the taskforce, the key to progress
on the different PFI programs, for instance the Prison Service, is
the establishment of "a commercially acceptable form of con-
tract." In September 1999, the Treasury Taskforce issued a Gen-
eral Guidance on the Standardization of the PI contracts after two
years of work involving consultation with hundreds of stakehold-
ers. As stated in a press release dated July 14, 1999, "the new
contract guidelines will act as a blueprint for the future develop-
ment of PFI and ensure that future PFL contracts across different
public services will be able to follow a consistent approach by
incorporating standard conditions into the contracts." These
standard forms deal with cost-related issues and aim to address
them in a cost-efficient way for taxpayers, the public authority,
and the investors. The British government has adapted its pub-
lic rules and practice to the market in an effort to reach a com-
promise approach balancing the needs of all project players.
The purpose of this initiative was indeed to command the sup-
port of a broad majority of participants in PFI projects in both
the public and private sector alike.19
The government's concern has been to reduce the costs as-
sociated with tender documents, legal fees, and negotiation
costs. This initiative has been successful. Bidding periods have
become shorter, transaction costs have decreased, deals have be-
come more predictable, and projects are therefore easier to
complete. The result for bidders is less uncertainty and for the
public sector better value for money. Bidders and lenders know
what to expect. Any standard form of contract that the public
sector uses in the United Kingdom now spares the players "from
re-inventing the wheel at considerable expense every time a hos-
pital or a college enters into a PFI arrangement.... Consulta-
tion with hundreds of interested parties has produced guidance
19. Underlying the choice of standard contractual terms, the United Kingdom
government has also made, as it would have done so in the case of enactment of a
project finance law, policy choices.
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which provides the public sector with a practical toolkit deliver-
ing the very best value to the tax payers. '20 With this contractual
framework available, it is expected that public sector-procuring
authorities approach PFI deals in the same way, reducing costs
associated with inconsistency and re-invention.
In its publication Further Contractual Issues, the Treasury
Taskforce has dealt with the most commonly encountered issues
in project finance transactions, such as payment mechanisms,
performance incentives, monitoring performance, change of
control, termination, step-in rights for the public sector, step-in
rights for lenders, change mechanisms, and legislative risks.2' In
the case of termination, for instance, it is acknowledged that the
public sector should not be able to terminate the concession
agreement at will, but should be entitled to do so in the event of
a default by the project company. In this case of default, the PFI
publication hesitates compensating the project company, as ser-
vice is no longer being provided. However, in the case of termi-
nation for default by the public authority, it is recognized that
full compensation of debt and equity is appropriate. 22
2. General Project Finance Legislation: The Italian Example
The Italian approach has been slightly different. Project fi-
nance saw its dawn in Italy in 1992 when new legislation was en-
acted to encourage independent power production,2 3 but it was
not before 1994 that this legislation could be really used to sup-
port project financing in the energy sector.24 Then with the
spread of project financing to a wider range of sectors, Italy de-
cided it needed another law.
After more than three years of drafting, re-drafting, and lob-
bying, in 1998, a general law, The Merloni Ter,25 was enacted in
20. See Press Release, Chief Secretary to the Treasury Alan Milburn (July 14, 1999).
21. See VINTER, supra note 6, at 248-53.
22. Id. at 250.
23. Law 9/91 and Resolution CIP 6/92. See Franco Vigliano, An Overview of the
Market at the Beginning of Year 2000, IT'L FIN. L. Rav. 25 (Mar. 2000).
24. The Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Handicraft ("MICA") issued such a
decree on August 4, 1994. Since then, a number of high profile projects have been
closed in the energy sector, including Sarlux, Isab Energy, Api Energia, Rosen, Serene,
and Centro Energia.
25. It was first introduced in November 1998 by way of an addition to the Public
Works Act of 1994 (Law 109/94) and then amended in December 1998 (Law 415/98
published in the Official Gazette of December 4, 1998). On December 10, 1998, the
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Italy to govern concessions of public projects and major aspects
of project finance transactions. 26 This state initiative was in re-
sponse to domestic and international market pressure. At the
time of enactment, Italy had to avert a domestic public infra-
structure crisis while complying with the criteria imposed by the
Maastricht Treaty to join the European Monetary Union, such as
a reduction of the public deficit to no more than 3% of the
GDP. The Italian legislation introduces new common law fea-
tures, such as the floating charge and the step-in right of the
lenders, foreign to the civil law tradition, to reflect international
practice. It was lengthily debated and negotiated by the Parlia-
ment because of its innovative content.
The Merloni Ter acknowledges the right of the lender to
step-in and replace the project company in case of a default
under the concession agreement or the financing contract to
cure the default and avoid the termination of the concession.
27
It also gives lenders a first priority security right over the project
company's movable assets. It fills in the gap in Italian law of a
single lien on assets of variable size.28 The introduction of this
common law concept of floating charge was controversial. A
compromise was found by inserting a reference to the Civil Code
to ensure that bona fide possessors would be adequately pro-
tected. This reference, however, disrupted the coherence of the
Article so that "it is not clear under which circumstances the
right of a bona fide possessor does or does not prevail."29 It also
potentially changes the way in which security interests might be
interpreted more generally under Italian law, despite an appar-
Italian Government approved the required implementation regulations for the Merloni
Ter to be applied on December 22, 1998, and April 19, 1999. The Ministry of Public
Works issued two circular letters of interpretation concerning the application of the
new rules to concessions already awarded and projects already in the development
phase.
26. See Graham & James LLP, The New Law on Project Finance in Italy, INT'L FIN. L.
REV. 12 (July 1999).
27. See Article 37octies of the Merloni Ter.
28. See Article 37nonies of the Merloni Ter.
29. See Vigliano, supra note 23. Vigliano participated to the drafting of the articles
on project financing in the Merloni Ter. He explains "how the original draft was
straightforward and was based on the registration and publication of the lien, but the
concern to protect the interest of third parties coming in good faith into possession of
the company's assets led to the inclusion of a reference to Article 1153 of the Civil code,
so that it is not clear under which circumstances the right of a bona fide possessor does
or does not prevail."
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ent attempt to reserve this new concept to project finance trans-
actions. In any event, it gives lenders in project finance circum-
stances a valuable and easy-to-use security instrument in addition
to the usual protections they seek in structured deals."0
The Merloni Ter also acknowledges that the concessione di
lavori pubblici (concession of public work) is a contract and that
the rules of contract law apply to both the concessionaire and
the public authority.3' In addition, it introduces a financial bal-
ance clause that addresses risks to be borne by the public author-
ity, such as a variation in the scope of the service to be provided
under the concession agreement or a change of law. It is aimed
at putting the concessionaire back into the same position it
would have been in, but for the occurrence of these risks. 32 The
concessionaire is entitled to receive compensation for the costs
incurred and the loss of profits suffered. Compensation may in-
clude a revision of the fares or tariffs levied against the public
authority or the customers and an extension of the duration of
the concession. This clause mirrors remedies that are practiced
around the world.
Furthermore, the Merloni Ter states that the winners of the
bid may incorporate a limited liability company that will auto-
matically become the concessionaire to build and operate the
public project without any further approval of the public author-
ity.3 3 This company is the special-purpose vehicle that is charac-
teristic of project finance transactions. Aware of the crucial
need for funds to finance expensive projects, the Italian govern-
ment allowed this vehicle to issue bonds beyond the limits other-
wise provided by Italian company law, that is, to issue debt ex-
ceeding the company's equity.34 A new Article deals with the
termination of the concession and the manner in which hand-
over to the state is to take place, including payment of compen-
sation. 35 Finally the Merloni Ter allows the parties to subject any
30. The lenders will be able to receive any money payable to the project company
pursuant to a sale of assets.
31. Unless otherwise provided in the Merloni Ter, see Article 19.2 of the Merloni
Ter.
32. This clause is commonly found in concession agreements. The financial bal-
ance is guaranteed throughout the term of the concession. SeeArticles 19.2 and 19.2bis
of the Merloni Ter.
33. Section 37quinquies of the Merloni Ter.
34. Article 37sexies of the Merloni Ter.
35. Article 37septies of the Merloni Ter.
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dispute relating to the concession agreement to arbitration.
Following the Merloni Ter, the Italian Parliament adopted a
law setting up a unit ("Unit") to advise public authorities on pro-
ject finance and identify relevant issues in order to shape devel-
opment of public private partnerships as a whole in Italy. The
role of the Unit is to (a) promote project financing within the
public administration, (b) assist public entities in structuring the
terms of their concessions to attract and support private financ-
ing, and (c) advise in the evaluation and selection of proposals. "6
In 1999, two purposes were added to the Unit: (d) the standard-
ization of documentation and the streamlining of procedures to
facilitate private lending and (e) assistance to public administra-
tors in identifying, preventing, and solving problems in connec-
tion with project financing.37 Its role was inspired by the United
Kingdom PFI Taskforce described above.3"
The Merloni Ter deals with provisions that are usually sub-
ject to tension and negotiation between the private and public
parties (e.g., financial balance clause and compensation in case
of termination of the concession). It also includes provisions
that lenders usually seek (e.g., right to step-in and a first priority
security interest). There is no doubt that this law was drafted
with a high degree of knowledge of, and attentiveness to, current
international practice and a desire to create a safe, predictable,
and stable legal environment for the private players. As a result,
Italy has become a favorable jurisdiction for private investment.
There is no express reference to the public interest, but the lat-
ter imbues the whole Italian legal tradition and is to be found in
other areas of Italian law. The current legislation is a significant
development in a legal culture that has been traditionally reluc-
tant to divest itself of any responsibility to the private sector for
fear of compromising the best public interest. It contributes to
the general tendency of convergence of law.
3. Sector-specific Concern in General Project Finance
Legislation: The Turkish Example
Turkey's approach to project finance has been a little less
36. Article 7 of Law 144/99 (May 17, 1999).
37. On July 9, 1999 (Res. 63/99), the Interministerial Committee for Economic
Planning ("CIPE") issued the Regulation of the Unit and added these two purposes.
38. See supra Section I(A) (1).
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comprehensive. It has enacted a series of new laws relating to
project finance in general and dealing more specifically with en-
ergy projects. 9 The approach in this case is grounded in Tur-
key's familiarity with the concept of "concession."
Before the adoption of the current legislation, concession
agreements were governed by administrative law following a well-
established distinction in civil law countries between private
commercial law and administrative law. The application of ad-
ministrative law gave the public authority unilateral powers of
alteration of the project scope and services and submitted the
agreement to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court, the Council of State ("Danistay"). Such applica-
tion of administrative law represented a serious country risk that
rendered the project unbankable or bankable only at high pro-
ject finance margins and arrangement fees. Before providing
funding, lenders in project finance transactions assess the stabil-
ity of the project, especially the steady revenue stream. Any
change of scope, entities, or type of service impacts the revenue
stream and the ability of the project company to service the lend-
ers' debt.
In addition, for many years, the Turkish Constitution pre-
vented the development of many privately financed projects.
The Turkish Constitutional Court held in 1996 that all power
projects were concession contracts subject to the Danistay. The
risk that this court recast contracts in a strong pro-government
mold, expanding the definition of company default while elimi-
nating any possibility of government default or lender step-in or
assignment rights, was paramount.4 ° Under these circum-
stances, most lenders refused to finance power projects, thus
causing a shortage of electricity generating capacity in Turkey.
Both the relevant legislation and the Constitution had to be
amended to attract private investment and to serve Turkey's citi-
zens' crucial need for energy.
In 1999, the Constitution was amended to (1) enable the
Turkish Parliament to pass legislation acknowledging that con-
cession agreements in energy projects could be private law con-
39. The first law on project finance was passed in 1984 (Law 3096) and is often
referred to as the BOT Law. It was supplemented by the enactment of a more general
BOT Law (Law 3996) that applies to all BOT projects. See Leigh Hall & Emre Derman,
Turkey Puts the Final Piece in the IPP Legislative Jigsaw, 188 PROJECT FIN. INT'L 56 (2000).
40. See Hall & Derman, supra note 39, at 56.
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tracts, (2) enable disputes under concession agreements dealing
with provision of a public service and involving a foreign ele-
ment to be submitted to national or international arbitration,
and (3) remove the Danistay's binding authority to review con-
cession agreements.41 These changes clearly reflected the Turk-
ish Parliament's political will to create a legal environment
favorable to private participation in the energy sector by apply-
ing private commercial law principles and arbitration to power
projects.4 2 Legislation was adopted in December 1999 to imple-
ment these changes.43
The first law confirmed the reduction in scope of review of
the Danistay.4 4 The second law amended the hitherto ineffective
general legislation on project finance to insert generation, trans-
mission, and distribution of energy into its scope (Article 2) and
to submit concession agreements, now called implementation
agreements, to private law, as opposed to administrative law (Ar-
ticle 5).4" These amendments accordingly denied the public au-
thority granting the concession unilateral powers of alteration,
forcing it to play by private rules. The mitigation of this political
risk brought the predictability and stability required by private
investors to carry out projects in Turkey.
Along with the United Kingdom and Italian examples, the
Turkish example is another good illustration of a high level of
attentiveness to project finance practice by a state. Turkey's law
is, however, less exhaustive and clear than the Italian legislation.
Numerous issues have not been dealt with, such as the lender's
right to step-in in case of an event of default under the conces-
sion agreement or the financing contract, or the concession-
aire's right to receive compensation in case of termination of the
concession agreement or security interests. The latter are still
addressed under general Turkish law that defines them restric-
tively. For instance, the lender must take physical possession of
the movable assets concerned to obtain a pledge on them, the
only exception being "enterprise pledges" (pledges of all of a
41. Id. at 57.
42. Id.
43. Laws 4492 and 4493 (Dec. 21, 1999). See Hall & Derman, supra note 39, at 57.
44. Law 4492 (Dec. 21, 1999).
45. Law 4493 (Dec. 21, 1999). See Hall & Derman, supra note 39, at 57, 58. An
additional legislation was passed in January 2000 (Law 4501) to apply these reforms to
existing concession agreements.
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business's assets and operations). In addition, these legislative
reforms have not been given full effect because of the practice
by Turkish public authorities of issuing one-sided implementa-
tion agreements. As part of the Turkish government's political
will to address this, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Re-
sources has undertaken to draft a standard form of implementa-
tion agreement that would be more flexible and more favorable
to private investors.
These three examples show states' awareness of current in-
ternational practice and creativity in adopting relevant legal pro-
visions to their local specificities. Each of these countries wanted
to achieve the same goal of creating a legal framework favorable
to private investment. All seem to converge on the same values
and principles, although they differ slightly in the way, and to
the extent, in which they implement them. Certain practition-
ers, however, still complain about the uncertainty and ambiguity
of these laws. In their opinion, state legislators need to review,
clarify, and refine their current legislation on project finance.
B. Analysis of Convergence of Law at the State Level
Although the introduction of new legislation may generate
costs, it is more likely that focused state initiatives will reduce
costs where a political will exists to attract private investment and
where there is a clear understanding of what constitutes "project
finance."46 Convergence of law at the state level, however, raises
the question of whether this spontaneous initiative has moved
states towards appropriate convergence that meets the twin goals
of project finance. This question may be addressed by looking at
three aspects of this state process: (a) its decentralized approach
to convergence favorable to private investment and public inter-
est considerations, (b) its submission to influence and lobbying
of interest groups, and (c) its implementation at the expense of
other considerations, such as the coherence of the existing legal
system and culture.
46. These two elements (political will and understanding of project finance) have
been missing in China. See Melissa Thomas, The Pressures of Project Finance: Beijing Tight-
ens Its Regulatory Grip On Foreign Project Finance Deals, CHINA Bus. REv. (Mar. 7, 1998),
available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/9803/thomas.html. For example,
she refers to the introduction of new approval requirements for projects to be financed
privately and of regulations creating new uncertainties on most currency issues.
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1. A Spontaneous Decentralized Process to Convergence
This approach to legal convergence contrasts with the cen-
tralized transnational and technocratic approach of multilateral
organizations at the international level.4 7 It relies on a general
tendency among states to apply and enact the same concepts in
project finance (e.g., submission of the concession agreement to
private commercial law and arbitration). Actual practice sug-
gests that states may be able to achieve spontaneous uniformity
freely.48 As Ribstein and Kobayashi advise, "in the long run, the
best solution to the problem of inefficient and inconsistent state
laws may be more competition among the states rather than
more uniform laws."49 Does the same rule apply to project fi-
nance? The question is whether the simple fact that more and
more countries compete among themselves to attract private in-
vestment, leads them to freely adopt appropriate legislation on
project finance without a need for international guidelines.
The Turkish and Italian examples are a good illustration of
competition among states to attract private investment and of
the efficiency of this process. Both countries inserted new con-
cepts into their current legislation. Italy especially was extremely
innovative since it introduced foreign common law concepts
into its project finance legislation. They spontaneously sorted
out the provisions relevant to their needs. Interestingly, these
provisions are quite similar and, accordingly, will reduce the
costs of diverging legislation.
Competition to attract private investment may thus motivate
countries to be more responsive to the needs of investors and in
turn lead to convergence in legislation in the interests of effi-
ciency. It may result in a "race to the top."5 However, state leg-
islators may be prone to acting in the interests of specific groups,
47. See infra Section IlI.
48. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 11, at 181; see also Bruce H. Kobayashi &
Larry Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence From the Evolution of the
Limited Liability Company, 34 EcON. INQUiRy 464 (1996); Saul Levmore, Variety and Uni-
formity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987).
49. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 11, at 187.
50. A case-by-case analysis would have to be made in the field of project finance to
decide whether competition among states results in a race to the top or a race to the
bottom. For general discussions in the corporate field, see William Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663 (1974); Lucian A. Bebchuk,
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law,
105 HARV. L. REv. 1435 (1992).
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such as their state constituencies, the representatives in power
(e.g., the ethnic minority in power), or industry groups, and
overlooking their own public interest considerations.51 This may
then lead to a "race to the bottom."
In this decentralized lawmaking process, private partici-
pants look for a flexible legal framework that gives them options.
This flexibility can be achieved by adopting default, as opposed
to mandatory, rules that project players may reverse in light of
their particular circumstances.52 In the three state examples, the
legal provisions seem to fall into the two categories of rules, al-
though it is difficult to distinguish between them. For instance,
submission to arbitration or the application of private commer-
cial rules are likely to be default rules, whereas the obligation of
the public authority to compensate the project company in the
event of termination for its own default is likely to be a
mandatory rule. States may experiment as they choose between
mandatory and default rules. However, they need to be clear
which rules are default rules and which are mandatory in their
enactment to create the stable and predictable legal framework
that participants seek.53
In addition to satisfying the needs of private players, this
state initiative is likely to be well suited to local variations and to
take into account certain immediate public policy considera-
tions, such as continuity in the provision of the public service,
local employment and skill transfer, and completion of the pro-
ject as soon as possible. For instance, in South Africa, employ-
ment of local labor and skill transfer are key components en-
twined in the development of project finance.54 They are per-
ceived as tools for economic and political empowerment of
51. See infra Section I(B) (2)-(3).
52. For a general analysis of the concept of default rules in ordinary contracts, see
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). For a critical approach to uniform default rules in
international commercial transactions, Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales
Law, 39 VA.J. INT'L L. 671 (1999). Also, for an example of default rules in the interna-
tional context, see Karin L. Kizer, Minding the Gap: Determining Interest Rates under the
U.N. Convention for the International Sale of Goods, 65 U. CHi. L. Rav. 1279 (1998).
53. For a need of clarity in distinguishing between default, mandatory and en-
forcement rules of contract, and for the development of a minimum body of unitary
mandatory European contract law see Ugo Mattei, Efficiency and Equal protection in the
New European Contract Law: Mandatory, Default and Enforcement Rules, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.
537 (1999).
54. See Natasha Calvert, Roads Merry-go-Rand, 215 PROJECT FIN. 28, 31 (2001).
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disadvantaged groups. Thus, in all South African government-
awarded tenders, a minimum percent of the concessionaire must
be made up of so-called black empowerment groups.55 To en-
sure that skill transfer really takes place at all levels (e.g., at the
project company level or at the operations level), a complicated
point system has been put in place.56 Failure to meet the mini-
mum required level of points carries heavy financial penalties. 7
This obligation to employ local labor can be an additional bur-
den on private players, but this is the way the South African gov-
ernment wants to promote economic and social development,
and balance public and private interests.
Wider public interests may, however, be neglected in state
normative initiatives, such as compliance with international la-
bor and human rights standards. Although these interests may
be covered in other areas of legislation, countries may fail to ad-
dress them.
2. Influence and Lobbying of Interest Groups
As seen, domestic legislation has been amended to meet the
needs and expectations of private market players. The issue is,
however, whether these laws have been enacted under the influ-
ence of a group that is also the owner of companies operating in
the relevant sector or a group acting on political rather than
technical grounds. It is more likely that a country that lacks ex-
pertise in the field of project finance will be subject to the lobby-
ing of special interest groups (e.g., western energy companies,
engineering and construction firms, and financiers) in the law-
making process. The role of these interest groups ranges from
lobbying for legislation to funding its drafting and even to partic-
ipating in the drafting.
For example, when Russian legislators were drafting the re-
public's petroleum laws (the Russian Petroleum Legislation Pro-
ject), western oil and gas companies funded and took part in the
drafting of the legislation. 58 "For their contributions, which av-
55. Id. In the prison, for instance, the stipulation was 40%.
56. Points are awarded for the inclusion of certain groups, individuals, and enter-
prises, at certain levels, with stipulations rising over the life of the project. Id.
57. Id.
58. The University of Houston Law Center (partially) funded the Russian Petro-
leum Legislation Project through a US$1.5 million program that it administered. See
Linda Himelstein, Big Oil Plays a Big Role Shaping Russia's Energy Laws; The Fox, Say Crit-
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erage[d] about $100,000 per donor, oil and gas companies
[were] allowed to review the draft laws and even put their own
representatives on the legislative-writing teams, where they
work[ed] alongside academics and private lawyers."59 This raises
the question of whether industry groups should be drafting the
very laws that will govern their industry and whether national
interests (e.g., environmental concerns and a country's financial
and public interests) can be adequately preserved in these cir-
cumstances. Capture of the legislative process by lawyers repre-
senting industry groups or financiers is part of the same phe-
nomenon. For instance, Tanzania recently amended its legisla-
tion to attract international financing and private investors to its
mining sector.6" In this respect, Gerard Holden, managing di-
rector and global head of mining and metals at Barclays Capital,
stated in a recent interview that "there is now no question over
security of title or the normal protections lenders seek in struc-
tured deals such as offshore accounts and robust security....
The lawyers involved in the Golden price deal spent a lot of time
with the Tanzanian government. '"61
Representatives of the government itself can also exercise
influence at the state level. For instance, in its effort to promote
the PFI, the previous government in the United Kingdom set up
a committee called the Private Finance Panel made up of twelve
leading individuals in the field of project finance from the pub-
lic and private sectors. This panel was abolished; one criticism,
among others, was that it had developed a tendency to take the
government's side on issues.6 2
One might, however, argue that the interests of the govern-
ment and those of the industry groups naturally converge. As to
the government, its goal is to attract foreign investment as
quickly as possible and to adopt legislation well suited to its cir-
cumstances (e.g., predictability and stability required by inves-
ics, Is Building the Henhouse, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 13, 1992, at 1. In her Article, Himelstein
questions the impartiality of the Houston project and the donor influence. The Hous-
ton project included participation and financial support from such companies as the
Exxon Corp., Conoco Inc., the Amoco Corp., and the Marathon Oil Co., all of which
invest in Russia.
59. Id. Himelstein claims that 18 industry representatives were serving on six legis-
lation-writing committees.
60. See Mining Act (1998).
61. See Louise Bowman, Pits-Tops, 214 PROJECT FIN. 52, 53 (2001).
62. See VINTER, supra note 6, at 241.
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tors and conservation of domestic resources). As to industry
groups, they help or guide the public entity in the drafting of
new legislation in their industry field because of their technical
and financial experience and understanding of international
practice. 3 Yet it is more likely that an industry group will tend
to further its own interest.
To what extent interest groups influence the drafting of
new legislation and to what extent such influence results in dam-
aging and unfair consequences for the relevant country requires
analysis on a case-by-case basis. In any event, a country that lacks
expertise and funding in the field of project finance is more
likely to be subject to the lobbying and pressure of interest
groups, thus potentially generating biased project finance laws
and cost resulting from breaches of public interest considera-
tions, such as labor, safety, and health standards.
3. Other Considerations
There is strong pressure to adopt market-oriented laws that
satisfy private investor expectations. This pressure may lead to
the enactment of legislative provisions to the detriment of the
coherence of the existing legal system and culture. As already
mentioned, the Italian and Turkish Parliament agreed to govern
the concession agreement between the project company and the
public authority with private commercial law instead of adminis-
trative law.64 The benefit of such change is obvious for the pri-
vate investor, but raises implications for the coherence of the
existing legal system and culture. For instance, one can now
wonder whether private commercial law, as opposed to adminis-
trative law, will also govern traditional concession agreements in
Turkey and Italy.
63. In response to Himelstein's criticism of the role of oil and gas industries in the
drafting of Russian oil laws and of the role of the University of Houston Law Center, see
Robert L. Klauss, Russian Oil Laws Are Being Drafted By Russian Experts, LEGAL TIMES, Feb.
3, 1992, at 24. Dean Klauss points out that Russian experts themselves write Russia's
petroleum legislation and that the Russian Parliament enacts legislation only after in-
tense scrutiny and debate. Indeed, the Russian Parliament only adopted a few provi-
sions proposed. In addition, "the Russian leadership considered it highly desirable that
the University of Houston Law Center project receive advice from the international oil
and gas industry to help assure that the laws would be workable. Ten academics from
various law schools in the United States and abroad on the project as well as experts
drawn from law firms, accounting firms and international oil companies."
64. See supra Section I (A) (2)-(3).
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Each legal system should be considered as a whole, "rather
than consisting of a loose collection of separable components, it
is tied together by a complex incentive structure."65 Modifying
one rule without changing the structure undermines the coher-
ence of the entire legal system. The establishment of a whole set
of legal rules for privately financed projects would therefore be
more appropriate since it would have its own legal coherence.
Even with the reform of its legal system, the host country
still has obstacles to overcome to attract private foreign invest-
ment. There are largely centered on the lack of understanding
of the new legal concepts by the relevant local public authorities.
This lack of understanding makes giving proper effect to the en-
abling legislation difficult. This is particularly so in countries
where there is a traditional resistance to tapping private re-
sources for public needs, such as Italy and Turkey, and where
there are powerful regional governments with relative auton-
omy, such as Italy, although this criticism has also been made
against the public sector in the United Kingdom. The need for
practical implementation and good understanding of, and famil-
iarity with, the new legislation by relevant public authorities is
therefore crucial. To tackle this lack of understanding, the Ital-
ian government set up a Unit whose role is to advise on, and
spread the concept of, project finance throughout central and
regional public administrations.66 The Unit's focus is indeed on
teaching the public sector about the private.
Finally a general criticism of this lawmaking process is that
despite spontaneous convergence of law, states may still have di-
verging and inadequate legislation that may discourage or slow
private investment, for instance on security interest issues. State
legislators may adopt provisions that do not fit their local speci-
ficities because they engage in "herd" behavior or are subject to
pressure of interest groups. An international framework may
help avoid or contain the adoption of inappropriate measures by
states. It may also help reconcile public and private considera-
tions. International organizations are less partial than state legis-
lators, thus having a more detached view from market needs of
65. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance
and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 213, 219 (1999).
66. See supra Section I(A) (2).
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the issues raised by project finance transactions. However,
within such an international framework, the responsibility for
defining the most suitable provisions for legislation, having re-
gard to the national or local context, should always belong to the
states.
II. CONVERGENCE OF LAW AT THE PRIVATE LEVEL: A
SPONTANEOUS PROCESS OF PRIVATE INITIATIVE
Convergence of law at the private level manifests itself in the
process of standardization of contractual forms. It raises the
question of whether private initiative can help move private play-
ers towards a convergence that meets the twin goals of project
finance. As the Essay will show, this route to convergence is not
enough to achieve the twin goals, but it is a necessary comple-
ment to the convergence of positive law at the state and interna-
tional levels.67 The Essay will first review and then analyze the
characteristics of convergence of law at the private level. It will
show the tension between, on the one hand, the benefits of
standardization and, on the other, the need for flexibility and
adaptation to national culture and circumstances.
A. Characteristics of Convergence of Law at the Private Level
Standard contract terms are developed in sectors that re-
quire a high degree of expertise and technicality. Participants
usually do not want to have their industry process (e.g., construc-
tion process) harmonized by legislation. This is the other facet,
or the complement, of convergence of positive law. The main
players are private participants whose motivation is liberalizing
the host country's market and furthering their own interests.
Law firms involved in project finance repeatedly use very
similar boilerplate provisions that they adapt to the specifics of
the project. Banking institutions, whether commercial or multi-
67. For a similar approach in the field of construction at the European level in
favor of harmonization through contract rather than through legislative intervention,
see John Uff QC & Nerys Jefford, European Harmonisation in the Field of Construction,
INTL CONSTRUCTION L. REV. 122 (1993). See also Dominic D. W. Helps, Harmonisation
of Construction Law and Practice-Part I: The Current Position, 14 INT'L CONSTRUCTION L.
REv. 525, 535 (1997) (stating "We suggest that, while some areas of construction law
and practice are amenable to direct harmonization, in other areas a more appropriate
course would be to achieve commercial harmonization through the vehicle of con-
tracts").
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lateral, have developed their own standard form of documenta-
tion for financing projects. They are usually reluctant to depart
from them and thus present them, or at least their central provi-
sions, on a "take it or leave it" basis. This is particularly true for
financing smaller projects. For larger projects, the financing
agreement is mostly negotiated, and subject to the introduction
of new and more sophisticated terms to mitigate the project risks
and ensure reliable repayment conditions. However, when lend-
ers use standard documentation, competition among them will
be more on the numbers and the economic conditions offered
than on the legal terms. Although a standard form may be a
starting point, it will, needless to say, be subject to modification
in order to reflect the characteristics of the project.
Industry groups tend nowadays to share information and to
standardize their practice. For instance, in November 1998, a
non-profit organization, the International Project Finance Asso-
ciation ("IPFA"), was created to promote and represent the in-
terests of the project finance industry and of those who work
within it.6 8 The aim of this association is to advance and spread
knowledge of a technical, economic, and professional nature re-
lated to project finance and to provide information on best prac-
tice that can be implemented in projects. 69 Such an association
is a contributing factor to the standardization of practice. Pro-
ject finance is no longer surrounded by secrecy and reserved
only for a select few.
In specific domains, industry associations have also pro-
duced standard form contracts; for instance, in the field of engi-
neering and construction, the FRdfration Internationale des In-
g~nieurs-Conseils ("FIDIC")70, the Institute of Civil Engineers
("ICE"), and the Engineering Advancement Association of Japan
("ENAA") have all developed such contracts. FIDIC is well
known for publishing standard form contracts relating to the
68. IPFA is based in London. For more information, see http://www.ipfa.org.
69. The IPFA mission and vision in IPFA members Directory 2000.
70. FIDIC is the International Federation of Consulting Engineers. It was founded
in Belgium in 1913 by the national associations of Belgium, France, and Switzerland.
The United Kingdom signed up as a member in 1949 followed by the United States in
1958. The newly industrialized countries started to become members in the 1970s. It
was only then that FIDIC became a real international organization. It now comprises 68
national member associations such as UK's Association of Consulting Engineers.
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procurement of building and engineering works. 71  In 1999,
FIDIC issued a contract for engineering, procurement, and con-
struction ("EPC") turnkey projects, the Silver Book, aimed ex-
pressly at Build-Operate-Transfer ("BOT") projects with a risk al-
location suitable for projects financed by private lenders on a
limited or non-recourse basis. FIDIC's prime objective, as stated
by the Chairman of the FIDIC Contracts Committee, John
Bowcock, is to prepare contract documents, the use of which will
ensure completion of projects on time and within budget while
providing fair payment provisions for both employer and con-
tractor.72
In the energy field in 1999, in the United States, a group of
over eighty Edison Electric Institute ("EEI") 73 member utilities,
affiliated and independent power marketers, and merchant
power and end-use representatives formed a working group and
drafting committee to prepare a model bilateral master agree-
ment containing the essential terms governing forward
purchases and sales of wholesale electricity. They drafted what is
now called the Standardized Master Power Purchase & Sales
Agreement, the "Master Contract." These standard forms con-
71. In September 1999, FIDIC published four new standard forms of contract that
are known by the colors of their respective covers:
(1) Conditions of Contract for Construction, also known as the "Red Book,"
which are recommended for building or engineering works designed by
the Employer or by his representative, the Engineer;
(2) Conditions of Contract for Plant and Design-Build, also known as the "Yel-
low Book," which are recommended for the provision of electrical and/or
mechanical plant, and for the design and execution of building or engi-
neering works;
(3) Conditions of Contract for EPC (Engineering, Procurement and Con-
struction) Turnkey Projects, also known as the "Silver Book," which are
recommended where one entity takes total responsibility for the design
and execution of an engineering project; and
(4) Short Form of Contract, which is recommended for building or engineer-
ing works of relatively small capital value.
See information available at http://www.fidic.org/resources/contracts.
72. Speech from John Bowcock, Chairman, FIDIC Contracts Committee, The Four
New FIDIC Forms of Contract-Introduction, in FIDIC NEw CONTRACrS LAUNCH SEMINAR
SERIES (1998) [hereinafter Bowcock Speech], available at http://www.fidic.org/re-
sources/contracts/launch/bowcockl.html.
73. Edison Electric Institute ("EEI") is the association of U.S. shareholder-owned
electric companies, international affiliates, and industry associates worldwide. "EEI's
mission focuses on advocating public policy; expanding market opportunities and pro-
viding strategic business information. EEI helps members compete effectively by ad-
vancing equitable policies and ensuring maximum options in a restructured industry."
See EEI Information, available at http://www.eei.org/ resources.
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tribute to the general tendency of convergence of law in a highly
diversified field such as project finance.
B. Analysis of Convergence of Law at the Private Level
Does convergence of law at the private level help move pri-
vate players towards a convergence that meets the twin goals of
project finance? Certain features of this convergence will be ex-
amined to answer this question. A cost-benefit analysis of this
route will show that uniform standard forms reduce transaction
costs. A form should, however, be as standard as is consistent
with flexibility so that it can be adapted to particular transactions
and to the legal framework of the host state where industry
groups work. This route is also more likely to be subject to the
influence and lobbying of interest groups, as well as be remote
from public interest considerations.
This private ordering highlights the need for diversity at the
private level. It brings innovation and experimentation to a le-
gal framework that might otherwise be too rigid.
1. Stability and Predictability of Practice: Reduction of
Transaction Costs
The use of standard forms is a source of contractual predict-
ability and stability, thus reducing transaction cost for the partici-
pants. For example, a systematic approach to the tendering pro-
cedure that sets out a transparent and efficient approach for ob-
taining, evaluating, and selecting bidders will decrease the costs
of tailor-made procedures. FIDIC has defined such a "Tender-
ing Procedure" for both civil engineering and electrical and
mechanical works that "is intended to assist both the employer
and the engineer in obtaining responsive and competitive ten-
ders with a minimum of qualification, formulated in such a way
that the tenders can be quickly and fairly assessed."74
The standardization of contractual terms reduces the cost
associated with risk, one of the most significant costs. This cost
reduction is especially true for risks that cannot be economically
insured or can be insured only at a very expensive price. One
aim of standard clauses is indeed to address project risks and to
specify how these risks are to be managed. The general princi-
74. See Bowcock Speech, supra note 72.
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ple that applies is that risks should be borne by the party best
able to control and mitigate them. From the Chairman of the
FIDIC Contracts Committee perspective, "underlying all FIDIC
documents has been a fair allocation of risks between the parties
to a contract." Although this view may, of course, be partisan, it
does reveal a concern to pre-allocate (fairly) the risks among the
parties. Such pre-allocation of risks will decrease the cost of the
transaction and increase its value, at least for certain players. It
is particularly crucial in the field of construction where the risks
of delay of completion and/or over-runs are extremely high and
expensive (e.g., payment of liquidated damages). It gives bid-
ders the opportunity to assess the risks that they will have to bear
in advance. The more the parties are familiar with the project
financing technique and its terms, the less time they will spend
arranging and negotiating them.
Standard form contracts focus the parties' attention on the
terms that are normally open for negotiation, the transaction's
"basic negotiable elements," and allow the parties, indeed en-
courage them, to take the remainder for granted.75 The Master
Contract prepared by EEI, for instance, provides that traders
should focus on these elements only: the price, quantity, loca-
tion, and duration of the power purchase and sale. FIDIC distin-
guishes in some of its contracts between the "General Condi-
tions" and the "Particular Conditions," the latter being left to the
discretion of the parties to modify the terms of the former.
76
75. The reduction of negotiation and drafting costs would still be likely even if the
parties decide that some of the clauses in a standard form of contract are inappropriate
for the particular project.
76. The FIDIC Contracts encompasses two parts. Part one deals with the General
Conditions of the particular contract, and part two with Special Conditions or Gui-
dance for the preparation of conditions of particular application. The way these parts
work together is as follows:
where a sub-clause in the General Conditions deals with a matter on which
different contract terms are likely to be applicable for different contracts, the
principles in writing the sub-clause are:
(a) users would find it more convenient if any provisions which they did not
wish to apply could simply be disregarded or deleted, than if additional
text had to be written (in the Particular Conditions) because the General
Conditions did not cover their requirements; or
(b) in other cases, where the application of (a) was thought to be inappropri-
ate, the sub-clause contains the provisions which were considered applica-
ble to most contracts.
In other words, provisions in the General Conditions that may be inappropriate for an
apparently typical contract can readily be disregarded or deleted in the Particular Con-
129720011
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Standard forms also give standardized (product) definitions that
in theory should engender a better and common understanding
of technical terms despite any cultural or background differ-
ences. Any costs related to drafting and negotiating will conse-
quently be reduced since the use of standard terms and condi-
tions will avoid the need for protracted debate on detailed word-
ing.
There is, however, always a risk of misunderstanding among
the players and a risk that some provisions may have different
consequences in different legal jurisdictions. There is therefore
a level of standardization that once exceeded may become
counterproductive. This also raises the question about how
much risk players in project finance transactions are ready to
bear and how much time they are ready to spend.
In addition, standard forms can be ill-adapted to a specific
transaction. In this situation, the standardization of forms, by
establishing norms that are taken as givens and not questioned,
may act inefficiently. It is a tradeoff to evaluate between, on the
one hand, the economic benefits of using standard forms for
every new deal resulting in certain economies of scale, and, on
the other, the cost of ignoring particular needs in a specific
transaction for the purpose of greater efficiency. A way to ad-
dress this concern is to ensure that the terms of the standard
form are default terms that the parties may cancel, modify, or
amend. As practice constantly outstrips the law, a form should
be as standard as is consistent with flexibility and innovation.
2. Influence and Lobbying of Interest Groups
Standard forms prepared by one interest group usually help
further the interest of this group. The problem associated with
these forms is then that they are too biased in favor of the group
(despite any claim of impartiality). As of today, there is no asso-
ciation or general independent body supervising the practice of
project finance that could develop "impartial" standard forms.
Standard form contracts can be abused when there are se-
vere disparities of bargaining power. This is true when exces-
sively strong parties draft contracts and present them to the
other party on a "take or leave it" basis that leaves no room for
ditions. See information on FIDIC available at http://www.fidic.org/resources/con-
tracts/launch/booenl.html.
CONVERGENCE IN INT'L PROJECT FINANCE
negotiation.77 For instance, lenders may refuse to negotiate cer-
tain representations and warranties or events of default under
their standard credit agreement. They may also request the cre-
ation and perfection of standard security interests over the pro-
ject assets and revenues for funding the project. In addition, a
change in the bargaining position of the players and a different
structuring of the transactions can cause inefficiency and cost.
Different approaches by, for example, PFI and FIDIC give
rise to significant differences between standard clauses.78
FIDIC79 is mainly the voice of engineers and other construction
professionals involved in engineering construction and the pro-
vision of mechanical and electrical plants. It focuses on con-
struction contracts in either private or public project finance
transactions.8" The Silver Book is, however, a good reflection of
the practice and the relationships between the project company
as employer and the construction company as the contractor in
project finance.8 1 As it is in reality, the contractor bears all re-
sponsibility for all aspects of the work in the Silver Book. It is
also required to assume certain obligations, such as ensuring
that its work complies with all the employer's obligations toward
the public authority.8 2 Contractor and employer are very likely
to rely on the Silver Book as a good compromise approach.
77. This is not specific to project finance, but to all types of adhesion contracts.
78. See Geoff Haley, Standard International Contract Clauses and U.K. Private Finance
Initiative Contracts, 10 EUR. Bus. L. REv. 346 (1999). He examines the approach taken
by FIDIC on certain key contractual issues and contrasts it to that taken by the United
Kingdom under PFI.
79. FIDIC is an association of national member associations and thus individual
firms of consulting engineers are not themselves members. However, many of the na-
tional associations of engineers represent other construction professionals such as ar-
chitects in addition to consulting engineers. FIDIC also has affiliate members who are
not engineers or construction professionals but organizations who have an interest in
the work it undertakes such as law firms and insurance companies.
Although the Chairman of the FIDIC Contracts Committee acknowledges that the
contents of the FIDIC documents are essentially determined by engineers drawing on
their extensive experience in contract management, he points out how much FIDIC
had tried to consult widely with those sectors likely to be involved in the use of those
documents, for instance the World Bank, the European International Contractors, or
the International Bar Association.
80. In the FIDIC terminology, the employer may be either the public sector or a
private entity.
81. See supra note 71.
82. For the first time, the contractor is deemed to have reviewed the obligations of
the employer vis-I-vis the public authority under the concession or license agreement.
It is therefore liable for the accuracy of these obligations.
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Even private commercial lenders whose involvement in prepar-
ing the Silver Book was apparently limited can consider this
master contract as an improvement from the time the construc-
tion agreement was tailor-made.
These standard forms are thus usually for the benefit of pri-
vate players. Although they may indirectly take into account
public interest considerations (e.g., provision of an uninter-
rupted public service), they are more likely to further their
members' interests. For instance, project sponsors may want to
insert a standard provision in their agreement with the public
authority stating that they should be granted exclusive rights to
provide a certain service so as to reduce the commercial risk of
their investment. The public authority may, however, have to
balance this private interest against the interests of consumers
and the economy as a whole.
Convergence through private ordering is thus too remote
from public interest consideration to be enough, by itself, to
achieve the twin goals of project finance. It is also not enough to
create a general stable and predictable legal environment. With-
out some degree of convergence of positive law, this form of
"soft" convergence is unlikely to achieve a great deal in practice.
It is a necessary complement to convergence of law in project
finance. It brings creativity and innovation within existing legal
frameworks.8 3
III. CONVERGENCE OF LAW AT THE INTERNATIONAL
LEVEL: THE UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE
The impulse to reduce diversity among legal systems in the
area of commerce has manifested itself for as long as people
have traded across political boundaries.8 4 In establishing UNCI-
TRAL 5 in 1966, the United Nations General Assembly recog-
nized that disparities in national laws governing international
trade created obstacles to the flow of trade and chartered the
83. See Grant Gilmore, On the Difflculties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J.
1339, 1358 (1948). "The only lesson that can be drawn from the fact that society is in
flux is... [to] keep the Code, in its final form, as general, as unspecific as possible. Let
the strategy strong points be as widely spaced as they can be and still defend the essen-
tial territory." Id.
84. See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L. L. 743, 744 (1999).
85. See UNCITRAL General Information, available at http://www.uncitral.org.
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Commission to be the vehicle by which the United Nations could
play a more active role in reducing or removing these legal ob-
stacles. UNCITRAL's mandate is to further the progressive har-
monization and unification of the law of international trade. It
has tried to encourage legal convergence in various fields.86
Aware of the importance of project finance as a tool for eco-
nomic and social development in many countries, UNCITRAL
has prepared and adopted a Legislative Guide on Privately Fi-
nanced Infrastructure Projects.87  These projects include
projects with respect to "physical facilities that provide services
essential to the general public." This Essay will first review and
then analyze the characteristics of the Legislative Guide.
A. Characteristics of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide
The purpose of the Legislative Guide is to create a common
sense approach on how project finance transactions should be
dealt with and how to harmonize the legal principles used. To
embrace the variety and complexity of these transactions, the
guide is a mixture of the values and policies of different coun-
tries combined with international practice." It advocates com-
promise on the countries' respective interests.8 9
One of the main challenges faced by UNCITRAL in its work
in project finance was to identify the common regulatory and
legal issues in different privately financed infrastructure projects
across various legal, political, and sociological contexts. The
86. For example, Sale of Goods, Arbitration, Electronic Commerce, Procurement,
Negotiable Instruments, Project Finance, Insolvency, Countertrade, Construction Con-
tracts, Guarantees, Receivables Financing, Letters of Credit, and Maritime Transport.
87. See UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure
Projects, 33rd Sess. (2000), General Assembly, Official Records, 55th Sess., Supplement
No 17 (A/55/17) [hereinafter Legislative Guide].
88. The scope of these projects cover various sectors and include various types of
facility, equipment, or system: power generation plants and power distribution net-
works; systems for local and long-distance telephone communications and data trans-
mission networks; desalination plants, waste water treatment plants, water distribution
facilities; facilities and equipment for waste collection and disposal; and physical instal-
lations and systems used for public transportation, such as urban and inter-urban rail-
ways, underground trains, bus lines, roads, bridges, tunnels, ports, airlines, and airports.
See UNCITRAL Introduction and Background Information, supra note 7, at 10.
89. Professor Vagts states that for transnational economic activity, in the absence
of international institutions with legislative functions, the treaty is effectively the only
way in which rules can be generated to keep up with the variety and complexity of this
activity. DETLEV F. VAcTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 20 (2d ed. 1998).
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challenge was compounded because relatively few of these
projects have passed the contractually agreed period of private
operation before being transferred to the public authority, thus
making it hard to assess the success of the entire project.9 ° UN-
CITRAL was inspired in this difficult task by the work of various
expert groups, such as the United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organization ("UNIDO") BOT Guidelines9a and the
World Development Reports.92
The Legislative Guide raises three issues of significance to
convergence. The first deals with the process by which the
Guide was drafted; the second addresses its form; and the third,
its structure. To prepare conventions (for instance, the New
York Convention) ,93 model laws (for instance, the Model Pro-
curement Law), 9 or legislative guides, UNCITRAL usually sets
up a working group consisting of experts, academics, and practi-
tioners specialized in the relevant subject matter to perform the
substantive preparatory work on the relevant topic.9" The work-
ing group develops a draft that the Commission adopts after suc-
cessive revisions in the light of conference review. Rather than
following this usual practice for drafting the Legislative Guide,
UNCITRAL assigned the task of preparing the drafts to the U.N.
Secretariat itself. It was assisted by a group of experts and sub-
mitted its drafts directly to the annual plenary Commission ses-
90. Except for those projects occurring in civil law countries with a tradition of
concession.
91. See United Nations Industrial Development Organization ("UNIDO"), Guide-
lines for Infrastructure Development Through Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Projects (1996)
[hereinafter the UNIDO BOT Guidelines]. One might wonder what is the relationship
between UNIDO and UNCITRAL, why UNCITRAL had also to prepare a legislative
guide and how successful UNIDO BOT guidelines have been.
92. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994: INFRASTRUCTURE FOR
DEVELOPMENT (1994); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996: FROM PLAN TO
MARKET (1996).
93. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards ("New York Convention") was adopted in New York in 1958. Since then, 121
countries have adopted the Convention.
94. UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services
with Guide to Enactment (the "Model Procurement Law") was adopted by the Commis-
sion in 1994.
95. The Commission is composed of 36 Member States representing national gov-
ernments chosen on a rotating basis by the U.N. General Assembly. Membership is
structured so as to be representative of the world's various geographic regions and its
principal economic and legal systems. It possesses a permanent secretariat ("Secreta-
iat") that administers its work and provides publicity.
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sions. As Professor Wallace has observed, "many countries did
not have expert delegates for the plenaries. As a consequence,
in my view, there has not been as rich an exchange among repre-
sentatives of different legal systems and traditions as there could
have been."96 One wonders why the preparation of the Legisla-
tive Guide was so removed from the usual process and whether
this chosen process may affect the legitimacy or effectiveness of
the Legislative Guide. One might only speculate that the Com-
mission was skeptical about the usefulness of preparing a guide
given the complexity of the subject. It may also be that this pro-
cess was a way to settle disagreement among experts as to which
issues to address and how to deal with them in the Legislative
Guide.
The second issue addresses the degree of convergence that
the Commission was trying to achieve in project finance. Rather
than drafting a model law, it merely prepared inspirational pol-
icy-oriented legislative recommendations for member countries
to consider when preparing new laws or reviewing the adequacy
of existing laws and regulations. These recommendations are
statements of general legal principles intended to guide the es-
tablishment of a legal framework favorable to private investment
in public infrastructure projects, but they do not include any
precise and concrete wording or model provisions that would be
more easily enacted by member countries. As stated in its intro-
ductory note, "the (Legislative) Guide is intended to be used as a
reference by national authorities and legislative bodies." 7 Wal-
lace disagrees with this approach stating that "rather than focus-
ing on creating precise legislative language, which would inevita-
bly have joined the difficult issues and sharpened our recom-
mendations, we spent several years on rather general and
descriptive, in the words of one expert, 'essay-like' text."9 8 Al-
though this comment relates to the notes attached to the legisla-
tive recommendations, it can be extended to the legislative rec-
ommendations themselves, which appear to be more like an aca-
demic exercise99 than a pragmatic ready-to-use guide.
96. See Don Wallace, Jr., UNCITRAL Draft Legislation Guide on Privately Financed In-
frastructure Projects: Achievements and Prospects, 8 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 283, 286
(2000).
97. See UNCITRAL Introduction and Background Information, supra note 7, at 7.
98. See Wallace, supra note 96, at 286.
99. In numerous books and articles, practitioners have addressed the issues raised
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At its thirty-third session, the Commission acknowledged
that the preference for a Legislative Guide had been mainly at-
tributable "to a lack of consensus as to which of the various issues
dealt with in the Guide might be suitable subjects for model leg-
islative provisions."10 ° It also recognized that the legislative rec-
ommendations, as written, would need to be analyzed and re-
worked by legislators and policy makers with significant exper-
tise in the area before they could be enacted. This process will
be costly and time consuming and doubtless beyond the reach of
poorer nations. Indeed, it negatively affects the usefulness of
these recommendations.
The proponents of the Legislative Guide focus on "the po-
tential difficulty and undesirability of formulating model legisla-
tive provisions on privately financed infrastructure projects in
view of the diversity of national legal traditions and administra-
tive practices."10 ' What is the legitimacy of this argument? It is
difficult to believe that project finance is more complex and di-
versified than, for instance, the international sale of goods. Both
raise complex legal issues and public policy questions. In any
event, the Commission is aware of those criticisms and the need
of some countries for more concrete guidance. It has therefore
decided that the question of the desirability and feasibility of
preparing a model law or model legislative provisions on se-
lected issues should be reconsidered at its thirty-fourth session in
June 2001.102
The third issue deals with the structure of the Legislative
Guide. Explanatory notes are attached to the legislative recom-
mendations. Although the introductory note defines a few basic
terms, it does not provide a glossary of standard terms.1 °3 For
these terms, such as financial and business terms, it advises the
reader "to consult other sources of information on the sub-
ject."1 4 Different state legislators are therefore likely to con-
by project financing. See VINTER, supra note 6; see also Marc Frilet, Some Universal Issues
in BOT Projects for Public Infrastructures, 14 INT'L CONSTRUCTION L. REv. 499 (1997); Tore
Wiwen-Nilsson, Underlying Conditions for Successful Infrastructure BOT Projects, 14 INT'L
CONSTRUCTION L. REv. 513 (1997).
100. See Legislative Guide, supra note 87, at 375.
101. Id. at 377.
102. Id. at 379.
103. See UNCITRAL Introduction and Background Information, supra note 7, at 9-
104. Id. at 9.
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strue the recommendations in different ways. Such divergent
implementation will conflict with the very aim of the Commis-
sion in preparing the Legislative Guide, that is, convergence of
law in international project finance.
B. Analysis of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide
Convergence of law in project finance at the international
level should aim to create a stable and predictable legal environ-
ment favorable to private investment and respectful of the public
interest of the host country.1 "5 Has the UNCITRAL Legislative
Guide achieved this aim? This Essay will first examine whether
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide has fulfilled the stated twin
goals of project finance and then whether legal convergence
under the auspices of the Guide is subject to the influence and
lobbying of interest groups.
1. Predictability and Stability of the Legal Environment
Favorable to Private Investment
As has already been said about model laws prepared by UN-
CITRAL in other fields, convergence of law gives investors cer-
tainty as to the legal rules that will apply. It accordingly reduces
the transaction costs created by inappropriate or silent state laws.
These costs include inconsistency costs, information costs, litiga-
tion costs, and instability costs. The same principle now applies
to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide.
As the Commission acknowledges in its introductory note,
although the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide "does not provide a
single set of model solutions to address these concerns, it helps
the reader to evaluate different approaches available and choose
the one suitable in the national or local context."106 This ab-
105. This Essay will not discuss the conflict ofjudicial interpretation of legal provi-
sions. It is a given that, in the event of a dispute, domestic courts determine the ulti-
mate construction of law and that they are likely to have diverging interpretations of
identical legal provisions. See Michael Sturley, International Uniform Laws in National
Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 729,
729 (1987). Professor Sturley examines the problem of conflicting interpretations and
its significance in the context of a particular international uniform law, the Brussels
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading (the
Hague Rules). Diverging judicial interpretation undermines the efficiency of uniform
laws. He looks especially at the major influence of domestic law in causing these con-
flicts of interpretation among national courts.
106. See UNCITRAL Introduction and Background Information, supra note 7, at 4.
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sence of concrete advice may, however, lead to uncertainty and
ambiguity for the member countries (interested in the Guide).
a. Identification of Issues
The Guide aims to create a stable and predictable legal envi-
ronment by identifying the major issues that private investors en-
counter in project finance transactions. For instance, it states
"the legislative and institutional framework for the implementa-
tion of privately financed infrastructure project should ensure
transparency, fairness and the long-term sustainability of
projects. Undesirable restrictions on private sector participation
in infrastructure development and operation should be elimi-
nated."1 7 The language used in this recommendation is power-
ful and sets a clear policy preference, despite being a compro-
mise text. The terms of transparency, fairness, and long-term
sustainability are then explained in the relevant note. 08 In an-
other recommendation, the Guide promotes the impartiality
and independence of the infrastructure operators and public
service providers.109 These principles may encourage the host
country to liberalize and render its processes and institutions
more impartial and transparent for the benefit of project partici-
pants. These recommendations are therefore helpful guidelines
for host countries.
The Legislative Guide also recommends that "the law
should identify the public authorities of the host country (in-
cluding, as appropriate, national, provincial, and local authori-
ties) that are empowered to award the concession to enter into
agreements for the implementation of privately financed infra-
structure projects." 1 0 Although drafted in very general and
broad terms, this recommendation meets one of the main con-
cerns of sponsors and lenders: that they know the identity and
precise power of the authority that will grant the concession
rights.
A similar concern for the private investors is obtaining all
107. See Legislative Guide, supra note 87, at 198 (Recommendation 1).
108. See UNCITRAL, Notes on the Legislative Recommendations on the General
Legislative and Institutional Framework, A/CN.9/471/Add.2, at 3-6 (33rd Sess., 2000)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL, Notes on the General Legislative and Institutional Frame-
work].
109. See Legislative Guide, supra note 87, at 213 (Recommendation 8).
110. See id. at 200 (Recommendation 2).
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approvals necessary for the implementation of the project, since
those approvals are usually a condition precedent to the com-
mencement of the project. Any delay or refusal to grant approv-
als would jeopardize the entire project. Recommendation 6
deals with this risk as follows: "Institutional mechanisms should
be established to coordinate the activities of the public authori-
ties responsible for issuing approvals, licenses, permits or autho-
rizations required for the implementation of privately financed
infrastructure projects in accordance with statutory or regulatory
provisions in the construction and operation of infrastructure fa-
cilities of the type concerned."' Once again, the language ap-
pears to be very general, but it mirrors the practice and the ex-
pectation of private players that the public authorities coordi-
nate their activities. UNCITRAL then recommends that
"regulatory competence should be entrusted to functionally in-
dependent bodies with a level of autonomy sufficient to ensure
that their decisions are taken without political interference or
inappropriate pressures from infrastructure operators and pub-
lic service providers." '112
The Legislative Guide thus highlights the issues that may
discourage private investment, and encourages the establish-
ment of a stable, transparent, fair, and predictable legal environ-
ment that, for example, identifies and encourages coordination
among the various relevant public authorities in charge of grant-
ing the concession and the relevant project approvals. It there-
fore educates any country interested in attracting private financ-
ing by focusing attention on these issues, but does it give any
practical and concrete advice on how to address them?
b. Absence of Concrete Guidance
In an ideal world, one would expect that the Legislative
Guide would provide clear and uniform principles so that coun-
tries could enact them easily, thus establishing a legal framework
favorable to private investment. For the purposes of the real
world of project finance, however, the legislative recommenda-
tions appear to be too general and imprecise to meet this goal.
The flexible wording of the legislative recommendations aims to
embrace and reflect the diversity of the legal systems of the dif-
111. Id. at 209 (Recommendation 6).
112. Id. at 213 (Recommendation 8).
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ferent member countries, but does not help these countries with
the implementation of the advice given. This lack of practical
guidance harms both private and public interests.
For example, the Legislative Guide shows great sensitivity to
the choice of law and the legal system of a country. Under Rec-
ommendation 40, the Guide states that "unless otherwise pro-
vided, the project agreement is governed by the law of the host
country." '113 Although very respectful of the local legal system,
such recommendation does not enhance countries' understand-
ing of private sector expectations. Some experts have explained
this respect by the fear of UNCITRAL of promoting legal re-
forms in conflict with the existing legal system of member states.
Concerning the establishment of an authority to regulate infra-
structure services, UNCITRAL indeed acknowledges, in its note,
that "the Guide does not thereby advocate the establishment of
any particular model or administrative structure." 14
Recommendation 12 states that "no unnecessary statutory
or regulatory limitations should be placed upon the contracting
authority's ability to agree on an allocation of risks that is suited
to the needs of the project."11 Although this recommendation
recognizes the crucial issue of allocation of risks in project fi-
nance transactions, it does not attempt to give any indication of
the sorts of risk that the public authority may well bear, such as
change of law risk. Each state legislator will thus decide in which
manner the allocation of risks can be best achieved. The deci-
sions will doubtless vary from one country to another. Such di-
vergence may cause additional cost for the players in project fi-
nance transactions. This cost is not, however, specific to the allo-
cation of risks; it is a cost associated with the legislative
recommendations in general since they are too broadly couched
to overcome the ambiguities that could otherwise have been
more prescriptively and more precisely addressed, or that would
otherwise mitigate the disparities among states. This vagueness
113. Id. at 292 (Recommendation 40).
114. For practical information and technical advice, the Guide refers to interna-
tional financial institutions that carry out programs to assist their member countries in
setting up an adequate regulatory framework (such as the World Bank and the regional
development banks). See UNCITRAL, Notes on the General Legislative and Institu-
tional Framework, supra 108, at 32.
115. See Legislative Guide, supra note 87, at 221 (Recommendation 12).
CONVERGENCE IN INT'L PROJECT FINANCE
may discourage state legislators from enacting the Guide's rec-
ommendations.
In addition, the general uncertainty of the Legislative Guide
may engender additional expense for implementing countries.
For instance, a common issue that private investors, especially
lenders, encounter when investing in a civil law country is a dif-
ferent set of security interest laws. In civil law countries, these
laws usually do not include the concept of floating charge and
prohibit the creation of security interests over public property in
the possession of the concessionaire. Recommendation 48 of
the Legislative Guide is another example of inefficient language.
This recommendation states that, for the purpose of raising the
funds required by the project, the concessionaire should have
the right to secure any financing,
[W]ith a security interest in any of its property, with a pledge
of shares of the project company, with a pledge of the pro-
ceeds and receivables arising out of the concession or with
other suitable security, without prejudice to any rule of law
that might prohibit the creation of security interests in public
property.116
It describes the different security interests that the concession-
aire may give in a host country but does not provide clear gui-
dance as to what the state legislators should be doing to meet the
private investors' expectations. What, then, is the aim of this rec-
ommendation? Does it compound uncertainty and all associ-
ated cost?
The relevant note, after describing the different legal re-
gimes with respect to security interests, then refers to initiatives
undertaken in different organizations to establish a model law
for the development of modern legislation on security interests,
such as the Model Law on Secured Transactions prepared by the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to assist
legislative reform efforts in central and eastern European coun-
tries. This reference can be helpful to countries that want to
review or improve their current security legislation.
However, clear and uniform rules for the development of
domestic security laws in the field of project finance would have
been preferable. This is a general comment that applies to the
whole Legislative Guide.
116. Id. at 311 (Recommendation 48).
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Although the Guide is useful for domestic legislators and
policy makers in understanding the issues raised by privately fi-
nanced public infrastructure and the private player's perspec-
tive, it remains too descriptive and general in its current state to
be enacted easily, especially by countries that lack expertise, and
knowledge, in the field of international project finance.
2. Respect for, or Promotion of, Public Interest Considerations
As seen above, the Legislative Guide addresses the concerns
raised by private investors, but does it also take into account pub-
lic interest considerations?
In its recommendations and relevant notes, the Legislative
Guide acknowledges the importance of the more commonly ad-
dressed public interest concerns such as the application of do-
mestic law; continuity in the provision of public services; envi-
ronmental protection; health, safety, and quality standards; and
fairness of prices. For example, the first Recommendation pro-
vides for the establishment of a legislative and institutional
framework that is transparent, fair, and ensures the long-term
sustainability of projects as a prerequisite for private investment
in infrastructure projects. 117 In the relevant note, the Guide ex-
plains how a "fair" legal framework,
[T]akes into account the various and (sometimes possibly
conflicting) interests of the government, the public service
providers and their customers and seeks to achieve an equita-
ble balance between them. The private sector's business con-
siderations, the users' right to adequate services, both in
terms of quality and price, the government's responsibility for
ensuring the continuous provision of essential services and its
role in promoting national infrastructure development are
but a few of the interests that deserve appropriate recognition
in the law. 1
18
It then recognizes that "an important objective of domestic legis-
lation on infrastructure development is to ensure the long-term
provision of public services, with increasing attention being paid
to environmental sustainability."" 9
117. See id. at 198 (Recommendation 1).
118. See UNCITRAL, Notes on the General Legislative and Institutional Frame-
work, supra note 108, at 5.
119. Id. at 6.
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Recommendation 52 also states that,
[T] he project agreement should set forth, as appropriate, the
extent of the concessionaire's obligations to ensure: (a) the
adaptation of the service so as to meet the actual demand for
the service; (b) the continuity of the service; (c) the availabil-
ity of the service under essentially the same conditions to all
users; (d) the non-discriminatory access, as appropriate, of
other service providers to any public infrastructure network
operated by the concessionaire.1 20
The concessionaire is therefore under an obligation to provide a
continuous public service and to ensure equal access of users to
the service. To fulfill this obligation, UNCITRAL recommends
that the project agreement should set forth "the procedures for
monitoring the concessionaire's performance and for taking
such reasonable actions as the contracting authority or a regula-
tory body may find appropriate, to ensure that the infrastructure
facility is properly operated and the services are provided in ac-
cordance with the applicable legal and contractual require-
ments."121
In addition to these public interest considerations stated in
the legislative recommendations, the notes discuss a few other
relevant areas of law that, without necessarily dealing directly
with privately financed infrastructure projects, may have an im-
pact on their implementation, for instance environmental pro-
tection.122 The relevant note recognizes the importance of envi-
ronmental protection as "a critical prerequisite to sustainable de-
velopment" and of any legislation to ensure this protection.
123
Once again, UNCITRAL sets policy preferences, but falls short
of giving any concrete advice to implement them. It then deals
very briefly and in very general terms with one crucial objective
of the public sector that is the "hand over" of the project (e.g.,
transfer of assets, technology, and services) at the expiry or ter-
mination of the concession period. 124 In the same broad recom-
120. See Legislative Guide, supra note 87, at 321 (Recommendation 52).
121. Id. at 324 (Recommendation 53).
122. See UNCITRAL, Notes on the Legislative Recommendations on Other Rele-
vant Areas of Law, A/CN.9/471/Add.8, at 42-44 (33rd Sess., 2000) [hereinafter UNCI-
TRAL Notes on Other Relevant Areas of Law].
123. Id. at 42.
124. Recommendation 67 states that:
[T]he project agreement should set out, as appropriate, the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties with respect to : (a) the transfer of technology required
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mendation, it only indirectly acknowledges the obligation of the
project company to (hire and) train local labor in the operation
and maintenance of the facilities. It does not, for instance, pro-
vide for the placement of a minimum amount of work with local
contractors. 2
5
One might have hoped that the legislative recommenda-
tions would have gone further to promote less explored public
interest considerations. This is particularly true for the promo-
tion of international standards in labor and even human
rights. 126 Although states are free to enact whatever provisions
they find relevant in the Legislative Guide, international pres-
sure combined with suggestive international norms drafted by
high-profile institutions, such as UNCITRAL, may be enough to
encourage host countries to modify their behavior to attract for-
eign investment or to resist private player pressure to neglect
adoption and enforcement of rules for labor and human rights
protections. 12 7 In addition to imposing new international obli-
gations on corporations for human rights violation, 121 for in-
stance, the focus should also be on state responsibility for enact-
for the operation of the facility; (b) the training of the contracting authority's
personnel or of a successor concessionaire in the operation and maintenance
of the facility; (c) the provision, by the concessionaire, of operation and main-
tenance services and the supply of spare parts, if required, for a reasonable
period after the transfer of the facility to the contracting authority or to a
successor concessionaire.
See Legislative Guide, supra note 87, at 355 (Recommendation 67).
125. See supra Section I (2)(c); see also VINTER, supra note 6, at 37.
126. In its addendum 8, UNCITRAL indicates the relevance of international agree-
ments for the implementation of privately financed infrastructure projects. It notes
that state membership in multilateral financial institutions may require that the rele-
vant state comply with a number of policy objectives, such as adherence to internation-
ally acceptable environmental standards, long-term sustainability of the project beyond
the initial concession period and transparency and integrity in the selection of the con-
cessionaire and the disbursement of loans. It does not, however, provide for compli-
ance with international standards in labor and human rights. See UNCITRAL, Notes on
Other Relevant Areas of Law, supra note 122, at 54.
However, the previous general counsel to the World Bank, Ibrahim F.I. Shihata,
favored a broader interpretation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment ("IBRD") to allow for human rights considerations "when such rights are of
a preponderantly economic (as opposed to political) nature or when such rights have a
'direct and obvious' effect on the economic condition of a member nation." John D.
Ciorciari, The Lawful Scope of Human Rights Criteria in World Bank Decisions: An Interpretive
Analysis of the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 331, 353 (2000).
127. In areas such as use of forced labor, torture or other forms of coercion, or
also corruption.
128. For a different theory of corporate responsibility for human rights protection,
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ment and enforcement of domestic law in accordance with inter-
national standards of human and labor rights. 129  Legal
convergence at the international level should promote the
spread of such standards.
Convergence of law for the protection of public interest in
project finance raises an interesting question: whether legal
convergence may help economic and social development and
broader development, such as democracy, from a public sector's
perspective. Although this is still a hope shared among a large
number of people today, it was especially the belief of the law
and development movement born in the mid-1960s.1" ° This
movement emphasizes the importance of law in the develop-
ment of a free market economy (which in turn would bring eco-
nomic growth) and liberal democratic values through the pro-
motion of western-style legal institutions. By the mid-1970s, how-
ever, the movement had lost its momentum. Its "liberal
legalism" was criticized as being "ethnocentric and naive ... ig-
noring social stratification and class cleavage" in developing
countries. 3' As of today, the movement has revived but this
time under the auspices of experts and practitioners specialized
in the relevant fields. They once again share the belief that uni-
formity or legal convergence may help reduce the influence of
arbitrary or oppressive governments and foster free market, de-
mocracy, and the rule of law in these countries. The Legislative
Guide is an instrument of this revival.
Legal convergence may, however, be at the expense of other
aspects of development. As Professor Chua notes, the problem
see Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: Toward A Theory of International
Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L. J.(forthcoming 2001).
129. For an application of the Alien Tort Claims Act to state responsibility for the
acts of some private actors, including corporations, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 13327 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Beanal v. Freeport McMoran, 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La.
1997), affd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
130. This movement was born at leading American law schools such as Harvard,
Stanford, Wisconsin, and Yale. For a good analysis of the movement, see Amy L. Chua,
Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108
YALE L. J. 1, 5 (1998); see alsoJohn H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On
the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP.
L. 457 (1977); Richard Bilder & Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development
Studies, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470 (1995).
131. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflec-
tions On the Crisis In Law And Development Studies In the United States, 4 Wis. L. REV. 1062,
1070, 1080 (1974).
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in the current paradigm is that "it ignores ethnicity and ethnic
conflict in the developing world."132 Chua highlights the inter-
relationship between marketization, democratization, and ethnic
conflict. 3 13 She shows how marketization, by either causing,
maintaining, or exacerbating the economic dominance of a par-
ticular ethnic minority at the expense of an impoverished major-
ity, develops an "ethnoeconomic resentment" against this minor-
ity.
1 34
Ignoring the interplay between these forces when enacting
legal provisions stated at the international level may fuel existing
tensions between ethnic groups in a country and aggravate eth-
nic inequalities in the distribution of wealth. It may then create
a situation of political instability further discouraging any private
financing. To avoid such instability the host country should
show significant sensitivity to particular ethnic and nationalist
structures and implement legal provisions in accordance with in-
ternational standards. UNCITRAL should clearly advocate that
convergence of law cannot be achieved unless the relevant coun-
tries share, or are willing to share, similar economic-market prin-
ciples and common legal values. 135 It should then collaborate
with, and co-ordinate the work of, state legislators to ensure an
appropriate implementation of its rules to the local context. In
turn, the Commission should be aware that any legislative re-
form in project finance could cause a redistribution of power
between private investors and public authority, as well as a redis-
tribution of wealth between various groups of the host state.
As shown, however, countries may not have the leeway, or
the will, to allow them to be attentive to public interest consider-
ations (e.g., environmental and safety interests) as well as mind-
ful for international standards of labor and human rights. They
132. See Chua, supra note 130, at 20.
133. Id. at 9, 33. She defines marketization as referring "to the whole spectrum of
efforts toward privatization and contractualization of economic activity in developing
and transitional economies, ranging from the replacement of a command economy
with market mechanisms to typical 'economic liberalization' measures (such as priva-
tization, liberalization of investment and trade restrictions and elimination of price con-
trols)." Id.
134. Id. at 37, 47.
135. For instance, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ex-
plicitly requires in its Articles of Agreement that it will only provide financing in or to
nations that have adopted multi-party democracy, respect for human rights, and free-
market principles. See John Linarelli, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and the Post-Cold War Era, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 376 (1995).
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tend to be more eager to satisfy market needs and expectations
in a rush to attract private investment. Legal convergence at the
state level is thus more partial than international convergence.
In pursuing the twin goals of project finance, international
model laws are therefore superior to state laws in defining a bal-
anced legal framework. They are better at striving to balance
predictability and stability of legal rules favorable to private in-
vestment and public interest considerations. They should, of
course, ideally, be flexible enough to adapt to national and local
specificities (e.g., legal, ethnic, and cultural). 13 6
3. Influence and Lobbying of Interest Groups
It is important to note that UNCITRAL relies in its process
on working groups made up of experts and representatives ac-
tive in the field (e.g., non-governmental organizations). Even in
the case of the Legislative Guide, the U.N. Secretariat relied on
member-states experts. These experts are either practitioners or
academics specialized in international law rather than represent-
atives of industry groups, politicians, or civil servants. The objec-
tive pursued by these experts is in theory to find common
ground or principles that transcend cultural, economic, and so-
cial differences and to draft the "best rules" that can be devised.
In addition, the sorting of efficient uniform provisions is the
task of state legislators rather than UNCITRAL. As Ribstein and
Kobayashi point out, "the NCCUSL has had success with propos-
als in areas in which uniformity is desirable and it is the efficient
sorting by state legislators, not the appropriate discretion of the
NCCUSL, that produces efficient uniformity." ' 7 State legisla-
tors have thus to select the provisions that they consider effi-
cient, those "in which a cost-benefit analysis suggests that uni-
formity is efficient" '138 and which appropriately balance private
and public interest considerations. The risk is, however, that an
efficient uniform proposal may lead to inefficient diversity when
different states' legislators choose to enact different provisions,
especially if the original proposal is too vaguely drafted.
As of today, the legislative recommendations of the Legisla-
136. International laws should not simply reflect western views of project financ-
ing.
137. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 11, at 133.
138. Id. at 131, 133.
1315
1316 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:1272
tive Guide are inadequate. To be enacted, they require a high
degree of expertise and sophistication that state legislators may
lack. There is therefore a need for a more practical approach
using clear and uniform rules on privately financed infrastruc-
ture projects."' A practical model law at the international level
has yet to be developed. In this difficult task, UNCITRAL may
be helped by the existing Legislative Guide that sets policy pref-
erences, identifies the issues that private players encounter in
project finance transactions and, importantly, notes the need to
balance the interests of the public and private sectors. UNCI-
TRAL can also inspire itself from existing state legislation, for
instance the British and Italian initiatives, as it sets about draft-
ing more precise legal rules at the international level.140
CONCLUSION
The trend toward convergence in international project fi-
nance is well established. Three sets of actors, each with their
own approach, are engaged in this process: states, private play-
ers, and international organizations. Their approach has been
assessed against the stated goals of project finance of reconciling
private and public interests.
The examination of these three routes to convergence
reveals strengths and weaknesses in each. State sponsored con-
vergence certainly meets, on the one hand, private interest con-
cerns, such as creating a legal environment favorable to private
participation and reducing transaction costs, and, on the other
hand, public interest requirements, such as satisfying the na-
tional interest and getting the project completed as soon as pos-
sible. However, in some of the examples seen, countries have, to
varying extents, neglected wider public interest considerations
from their normative initiative and/or allowed these initiatives
to be overly influenced by interest groups.
Private ordering is clearly best situated to protect private in-
terests. For example, lenders have successfully imposed certain
standard terms and practices that have become virtually non-ne-
139. This Essay will not discuss the nature and type of rules that a model law in
international project finance should insert.
140. See Steven Walt, supra note 52, at 702. "Continuity with national law reduces
legal uncertainty associated with the use of uniform sales law and therefore reduces its
cost to early users."
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gotiable. This route to convergence is also the farthest removed
from public interest considerations, such as heath, safety, and
quality standards and the protection of the environment.
International organizations are well placed to arbitrate the
tension between public and private interests and to help foster a
legal framework both favorable to private investment and re-
spectful of the public interest. They are more impartial, their
work being further removed from immediate needs and interest
group pressure. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, although
extremely helpful in identifying issues, is disappointing since it
lacks pragmatism and even neglects some public interest consid-
erations. The current legislative recommendations require a
high degree of expertise and sophistication that state legislators
may not have. There is therefore a need for a more practical,
balanced guidance for privately financed infrastructure projects
in the form of clear and uniform provisions yet to be defined in
an international model law.
This Essay proposes a blended approach as the best way to
achieve convergence in international project finance. At the in-
ternational level, UNCITRAL should state legal rules that attract
private investment and help enacting countries to meet their
public interest concerns. Techniques for the protection of pub-
lic interests should be well articulated so that individual coun-
tries are assisted in the task of adopting these rules as well as
encouraged in their resolve to protect such core interests.
In order to facilitate enactment by state legislators, these
rules should be clear, precise, and readily implementable. They
should also be flexible enough so that different legal systems
with differing legal traditions can adopt them. For instance, UN-
CITRAL could draft a minimum body of mandatory rules com-
bined with default provisions.
In turn, countries should enact market, as well as policy, ori-
ented laws. Market pressure and competition among states to
attract private investment should help this process and contrib-
ute to convergence. The framework to be defined by domestic
legislation should be general and flexible enough to keep pace
with developments in various sectors. An excessively detailed or
rigid legislation would stifle innovation or cause rules to be ap-
plied to contractual transactions for which they are not suitable.
One way would be to give participants the choice between a se-
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lection of adaptable default terms. This approach would pre-
serve and enhance the market participants' contractual freedom
and assist in the task of tailoring rules to specific project transac-
tions.
At the private level, the drawing up of standard conditions is
essential to most practitioners to reduce cost, and increase effi-
ciency, but such standard forms need to be sufficiently flexible
to allow for adaptation to the legal framework of the relevant
host country and to be compatible with public interest consider-
ations, as set out in international or state level norms.
Under this blended approach to convergence, project fi-
nance would become a vehicle of economic and social develop-
ment for the host country, respectful of its national interests and
preferences, and favorable to private investment. The combina-
tion of the three routes is therefore the best way to achieve con-
vergence in international project finance and reconcile private
and public interests.
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